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COMMENTS
LEGAL RIGHTS OF MARRIED WOMEN
IN TEXAS
I. INTRODUCTION
All of the contractual powers of the wife in Texas are said to be
derived from the acts of the legislature, while other powers, such as
the ability to convey property and to engage in lawsuits, which are
considered inherent in her right to own property, generally have
been limited by acts of the legislature. An understanding of the
relevant statutes and their development is therefore fundamental to
any profitable study of the legal status of married women in Texas.
Provisions in force today have come from every era of Texas history
since statehood, and some have remained in force though partially
inconsistent with later legislation. For these reasons, many cases
seemingly in conflict can be reconciled by chronological placement
in the statutory framework,' and actual conflicts between other cases
can be attributed to the uncorrelated condition of this legislation."
This Comment will discuss the development, including the 1957
amendments, of the wife's rights to contract, convey, and engage in
lawsuits.
II. HISTORY
Prior to 1913 the law empowered the husband with management
of his separate property, of all the community property, and of the
wife's separate property, subject to a limited power of the wife to
contract for the benefit of her separate property and for necessaries
When the wife contracted outside these statutory limits the contract
was voidable by her.' As a further restriction the husband was re-
quired to join in the conveyance of her separate lands.
The first major addition to the property rights of married women
1Lee v. Hall Music Co., 119 Tex. 547, 35 S.W.2d 685 (1931). Speer, Law of Marital
Rights in Texas S 167 (1929).
'Compare Dority v. Dority, 96 Tex. 215, 71 S.W. 950 (1903) with Bearden v. Knight,
149 Tex. 108, 228 S.W.2d 837 (1950).
'See, e.g., cases cited note 53 infra. For the purposes of this Comment it is assumed
that both husband and wife are living together and that both are legally competent. Dis-
cussion of the responsibility of either spouse for the torts of the other is outside the scope
of this Comment.4 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. arts. 4621, 4624 (1911); 23 Tex. Jur. Husband and Wife 55
165-66 (1932).
'Leake v. Saunders, 126 Tex. 69, 84 S.W.2d 993 (1935). The wife must plead her
coverture or she waives the defense. Whisenant v. Thompson Bros. Hardware Co., 120
S.W.2d 316 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938), 17 Tex. L. Rev. 217 (1938).
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in Texas occurred in the year 1913, when the wife was given the
power of sole management, control, and disposition of her separate
property, both real and personal, and of that portion of the com-
munity property made up of her personal earnings, rents from her
separate lands, and the income from her separate securities." The
husband retained control over his separate property and the remain-
der of the community. The statutory plan evidently envisioned two
community partnerships with control centered in the person who,
or whose property, produced the revenue.7 To secure the authority
given each spouse to manage his separate property and his portion of
the community, that property under his control was made exempt
from debts created by the other spouse.' The segment of community
property placed under the wife's control has often been called her
"special community," and that remaining under the dominion of
the husband, the "general community."' The act of 1913 re-
stricted the wife only in requiring her husband's joinder in the trans-
fer of her securities, in becoming a surety for another, and (as form-
erly) in conveying her separate realty. The former requirements
that the husband must sue for recovery of the wife's separate prop-
erty and that he must be joined in suits against her separate property
were retained."
The 1913 legislation made no mention of any power of the wife
to contract. In the act as originally passed, such power was pro-
vided for in what is now article 4623, which began: "The wife may
make any contract which she would be authorized to make but for
her marriage except those herein and elsewhere forbidden . .. ."
This provision would have allowed her to contract as if she were a
feme sole." Such an emancipation of the wife was objected to by
the Governor, and to avoid his veto the bill was recalled by a joint
resolution and the entire provision regarding contractual power was
stricken. 4 Article 4623 was thus left with only the provisions re-
6 Tex. Gen. Laws 1913, c. 32, p. 61, 16 Gammel, Laws of Texas 61 (1913).
Huie, Commentary on the Community Property Law of Texas, 13 Tex. Rev. Civ.
Stat. Ann. VII, XXXVII (1951).8 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. arts. 4621, 4624 (1911), as amended, Tex. Gen. Laws 1913,
c. 32, p. 61, 16 Gammel, Laws of Texas 61 (1913).
'These descriptions were used by Bobbitt, Is There More Than One Class of Com-
munity Property in Texas? 4 Tex. L. Rev. 154 (1925).
"0Tex. Gen. Laws 1913, c. 32, p. 61, 16 Gammel, Laws of Texas 61 (1913); Tex.
Gen. Laws 1897, c. 40, p. 41, 10 Gammel, Laws of Texas 41 (1897).
"Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. arts. 1983-85 (1925); Tannehill v. Tannehill, 171 S.W. 1050
(Tex. Civ. App. 1914).
12Red River Nat'l Bank v. Ferguson, 109 Tex. 287, 206 S.W. 923 (1918).
'a Id. at 926.
14 Letter of Gov. Colquitt, 33d Leg. Reg. Sess. 1913, Tex. House J. 1317; Speer.
op. cit. supra note 1, at S 168 n.16.
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garding the non-liability of the husband for her debts and requiring
his joinder in surety contracts and so remained until January 1, 1958,
when the joinder requirement was eliminated. The 1913 act did not
amend what is today article 4626, providing for the removal of her
disabilities for trading purposes; this article provides a procedure
whereby she can obtain express powers to contract and is discussed
infra.
In 1917 the legislature attempted to go one step further toward
what resembled a modern modified common-law system by making
the rents and revenue from separate land and the income from
separate securities the separate property of each spouse." Personal
earnings were not included in this change. This exclusion was prob-
ably intentional since even those community property states which
hold revenue from separate property to be separate do not so hold
with personal earnings." In compiling the 1925 revision, the 1913
provision expressly giving the wife power over the revenues of her
separate property was omitted. It must have seemed superfluous,
since the wife clearly had control over her separate property." But,
the first part of the same sentence which gave the wife control over
her personal earnings was also dropped, presumably through over-
sight." This omission left the statutes devoid of provisions granting
her control over her personal earnings, as they have never been
separate property. The provisions which exempted this revenue and
her earnings from the debts of the husband were allowed to remain,
however, and still do so today.' What is today article 4623 also
remained, and implies that revenues from separate property and her
earnings are still subject to her debts.
The enlargement of the wife's separate estate by the 1917 amend-
ments was declared unconstitutional in Arnold v. Leonard" as in
conflict with the definition of the wife's separate property in the
Texas Constitution. It was recognized, however, that the legislature
could freely amend her powers of control and disposition and could
exempt her property from the debts of the husband without violat-
ing the Constitution. To conform to this decision the provision
15 Tex. Gen. Laws 1917, c. 194, p. 436, 18 Gammel, Laws of Texas 436 (1917).
11 de Funiak, Principles of Community Property 163-65 (1943).
17 Huie, supra note 7, at XXXIX.
18 Id. at XXXX.
1 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 4616 (1925), as amended, Tex. Gen. & Spec. Laws 1957,
c. 407, p. 1233. Curiously, these revenues were still referred to as community property
by article 4623.
20114 Tex. 535, 273 S.W. 799 (1925); Tex. Const. art. XVI, § 15.
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declaring revenue from her separate property to be her separate
property was removed, but the provisions of the 1913 act which
placed it under the management and control of the wife were not
re-enacted." Thus, no statutory authorization remained for her con-
trol over the revenues of her separate real estate and securities or
her personal earnings. The only authorization for control remained
in what is today article 4614, providing for her sole control over
her separate property.
In 1957 the Legislative Council, backed by many women's clubs,
proposed amendments to article 4614 to provide for the wife as
follows: she may "contract and be contracted with, sue and be sued,
and her coverture shall not be a defense in any suit or action based
on such contracts."" The old requirement that the husband must
join in conveyances of her realty and transfers of her securities was
also to be dropped. They further proposed deleting the old listings
of article 4616 (which exempted from the husband's debts rents
from her separate realty and income from securities) in favor of
the broader expression exempting "revenue from her separate prop-
erty." The proviso in article 4623 that the husband join in surety-
ship contracts was also to be deleted."
The proposed modifications to articles 4616 and 4623 were
adopted as proposed, but the Senate amended the proposed article
4614 to make its benefits conditional on the wife's being twenty-
one years old and filing with the county clerk an acknowledged
statement that she elected to accept the benefits of the act.' Further-
more, the broad grant of power to contract in the proposed act was
modified to allow her to make binding contracts "in connection"
with her separate property. The act further provided that she might
sue and be sued alone-evidently when in connection with her sep-
arate property-and might convey her lands and securities without
the husband's joinder.
"Tex. Rev. Civ. Star. art. 4613-14 (1925), as amended, Tex. Gen. & Spec. Laws
1929, c. 32, p. 66, 26 Gammel, Laws of Texas 66 (1929).
"Texas Legislative Council, Report to the 55th Legislature on the Legal Status of
Married Women in Texas, Suggested Act No. 2 (1956). Assistance was given the Council
by Professors W. 0. Huie, Gus Hodges, and Millard H. Rudd of the University of Texas
Law School.
a" The Council's suggested act No. 1 which did not pass in any form, would have
dropped the wife's separate acknowledgment requirement.
4 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. arts. 4614, 4616, 4623 (1925), as amended, Tex. Gen. & Spec.
Laws 1957, c. 407, p. 1233. Detailed discussion may be found in the sections of this Com-
ment entitled: "Contractual Powers after the 1957 Amendments"; "Powers of Conveyance
and Transfer"; and "The Wife as a Party Litigant." The full text of these articles both
before and after 1957 is set out in the Appendix infra.
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III. CONTRACTUAL POWERS
A. Generally
1. In Regard To Her Separate Property
After the deletion of the clause in the 1913 legislation allowing
the wife sweeping powers to contract and after the mishaps of 1925
and 1929, there remained only the provision in article 4614, provid-
ing: "The wife shall have the sole management, control, and disposi-
tion of her separate property, both real and personal . . . ." The
courts have recognized that to effectuate this power of control the
wife must be allowed to make some contracts binding her separate
property."s Thus in Whitney Hardware Co. v. McMahan"5 the breach
of the wife's contract to make repairs on her separate buildings was
held to make the wife liable to the tenant on the ground that the
contract was a necessary incident to the management and use of her
separate property. In Cauble v. Beaver-Electra Refining Co." the
wife was held liable on a contract to purchase fuel oil for use in
operating her separate drilling business. Levin v. Jeffers"8 held a wife
liable for breach of her agreement with a contractor who was to
erect a building on her separate land. A wife has also been held
liable on her note given to pay off an outstanding mortgage which
was necessary to the preservation of her separate land." From a
study of these and similar cases, what relationship may we conclude
the contract need bear to the separate property in order for the wife
25 As to the liability of her special community property for debts contracted in the
management of her separate estate, see notes 60 and 79 infra and accompanying text. The
separate property of the husband is expressly exempted from the debts of the wife for
non-necessary items. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. arts. 4613, 4623 (1925). As the general com-
munity property is under the management of the husband and subject to his debts, Speer,
op. cit. supra note 1, at § 347, it is generally exempted from the debts of the wife, Tex.
Rev. Civ. Stat. arts. 4623, 4619 (1925), Shaw v. Finney, 7 S.W.2d 152 (Tex. Civ. App.
1928); Coats v. Bockstein, 176 S.W.2d 968 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943). Several cases, how-
ever, have held liable the wife's one-half interest in the community. Durian v. Curl, 155
Tex. 377, 286 S.W.2d 929 (1956); Cullum v. Lowe, 9 S.W.2d 70 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928),
criticized in Comment, 7 Tex. L. Rev. 615 (1929). See also Foster v. Hackworth, 164
S.W.2d 796 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942). Judge Speer favors liability of the husband for the
wife's debts not only for necessaries, but also on contracts to benefit her separate estate.
His conclusion is based on article 1984 (requiring the husband to be joined in suits based
on both such contracts) and the fact that the husband "receives the use, rents, profits
and occupation of her property during marriage." Speer, op. cit. supra note 1, at § 182.
Articles 4613 and 4623 are, however, contrary to such a conclusion, and article 4623 was
passed subsequent to article 1984. In fact, article 1984 might have been held to be par-
tially overruled by article 4623 and other amendments of 1913 but for Judge Speer's own
opinion in Tannehill v. Tannehill, 171 S.W. 1050 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914). As to his second
basis, it is certainly evident after the decision in Bearden v. Knight, 149 Tex. 108, 228
S.W.2d 837 (1950), that the husband does not receive the use of rents and revenues. See
also note 44 infra.
2 111 Tex. 242, 231 S.W. 694 (1921).
21 115 Tex. 1, 274 S.W. 120 (1925).
28 122 Tex. 83, 52 S.W.2d 81 (1932).
2 Farm & Home Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Abernathy, 129 Tex. 379, 102 S.W.2d 410
(1937).
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to be bound? Many cases state, often in the form of dictum, that
the wife can contract only to "benefit" her separate estate,"0 a word
first appearing in this context in pre-1913 legislation but dropped in
that year."' The word appears today only in article 1984, a procedur-
al statute enacted in 1848, which specifies that the husband must be
joined in suits against the wife on such contracts. The word "bene-
fit" naturally implies gain or desirable result to her property
from the contract, but actual benefit is no longer required; the test
is whether the material was furnished to be used to improve her
separate estate, not whether it was so used." The contract need not
be reasonable and proper and may result in considerable loss to her."
In many cases, if there was benefit at all, it flowed only to the com-
munity."4 The leading cases previously mentioned have used the
following phrases to describe the relation: "preserving her separate
estate;" "necessary to their operation, management and control;"
and "necessarily incidental to such control and management." Such
statements have led to the suggestion that the contract must "con-
cern" her separate property." No accurate generalization can be
drawn as each case will depend on the particular contract and the
type of property involved, but apparently the connection can be a
tenuous one. " The 1957 amendment to article 4614 providing that
after filing her election the wife can contract "in connection" with
her separate property is apparently a codification of this case law.
2. For Necessaries
The second type of transaction in which the wife can contract
and bind herself, i.e., her separate property and her special com-
munity, is for necessaries for herself and children." She is generally
not liable for necessaries for the husband. The source of this power
is articles 2423, 2424, and early judicial development. 9 Necessaries
0 Taylor v. Hullingsworth, 142 Tex. 158, 176 S.W.2d 733 (1943); Lewis v. Daniels,
126 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) error dism.; see also cases collected in 21 Tex.
Dig. Husband and Wife S 162 (1953).
3'Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 4624 (1911).
32 Willson v. Manasco, 63 S.W.2d 910 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933); Cauble v. Beaver-
Electra Ref. Co., 115 Tex. 1, 9, 274 S.W. 120, 122 (1925).3 3 Levin v. Jeffers, 122 Tex. 83, 89, 52 S.W.2d 81, 84 (1932).
34 Speer, op. cit. supra note 1, at S 179.
3 Tex. Jur. Husband and Wife § 171 (1932).
36 A separate line of cases has developed under the mercantile and trading statute which
restricts the wife if her separate property consists of a business. See the section of this
Comment dealing with article 4626, Section III, B., 2, infra.
" Harris v. Williams, 44 Tex. 124 (1875); Speer, op. cit. supra note 1, at § 176.
3'Magee v. White, 23 Tex. 180 (1859); Humbles v. Hefley-Stedman Motor Co.,
127 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939), 18 Tex. L. Rev. 91 (1939). But, in Finney v.
State, 308 S.W.2d 142 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957) error ref. n.r.e., article 3196a was held to
have engrafted an exception on the general rule, and the wife was held liable for treatment
received by her husband in a state hospital.
a" Hartley, Dig. of the Laws of Tex. 737 (1850). These today appear as Tex. Rev. Civ.
1959]
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are those items essential for maintenance of the wife's and children's
livelihood and vary according to the individual's normal standard of
living. ° This type contract should not be confused with the con-
tract in connection with her separate property for, unlike the latter
type, the contract for necessaries binds the husband's separate prop-
erty and the general community also."1
3. Respecting Revenues From Separate Property
Revenue from the wife's property and her personal earnings were
treated together in the 1913 act, which gave the wife complete con-
trol of both. Beginning with and following the 1917 legislation,
which attempted to make the revenues part of the wife's separate
estate, the law regarding these two types of property developed separ-
ately" and, consequently, they will be discussed separately.
As noted earlier, the act of 1913 provided that "the personal earn-
ings of the wife, the rents from the wife's real estate, the interest
on bonds and notes belonging to her and dividends on stocks owned
by her shall be under the control, management and disposition of
the wife alone . . . ."" Had this provision remained in the statutes it
is quite probable that the power to contract regarding these revenues
would have been implied as necessary to effectuate the wife's control
over them as in the case of the provision giving her control over her
separate property. The failure to include a similar provision when
the statutes were adjusted to conform to Arnold v. Leonard, how-
ever, left serious doubts whether or not control was to continue in
the wife. Judge Speer, writing in 1929, concluded that the omission
returned control to the husband as in pre-1913 law. Professor Huie
and other writers felt that the omission was inadvertent and that
the courts should regard control as remaining in the wife." Support
Stat. arts. 1984, 4624 (1925). See Christmas v. Smith, 10 Tex. 123 (1853); Speer, op. cit.
supra note 1, at § 176.
40 Speer, op. cit. supra note 1, at § 178.
"Moore v. Moore, 192 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art.
4613 and art. 4623 (1925), as amended, Tex. Gen. & Spec. Laws 1957, c. 407, p. 1234.
4 Note 15 supra and accompanying text.
4'Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. 4622 (1911), as amended, Tex. Gen. Laws 1913, c. 32, p. 61,
16 Gammel, Laws of Texas 61 (1913). See note 6 supra.
"'Judge Speer drafted the 1913 legislation but after the express power to contract was
removed in order to satisfy the governor, he felt that there was little left but the caption.
Speer, op. cit. supra note 1, at § 168 n.16. After the provision giving the wife control of
her special community property was omitted and the exemption statute allowed to re-
main, he concluded that the husband alone could "dispose" of this community property
by voluntary conveyance, but neither party could subject it to involuntary conveyance,
i.e., execution. Speer, op. cit. supra note 1, at §§ 347, 358.
4SHuie, Some Principles of Texas Community Property Law, 15 La. L. Rev. 605, 634
(1955); Kultgen, Management and Control of Community Property in Texas-Some Sug-
gestions for Reform, 3 Baylor L. Rev. 337, 342 (1951).
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for Professor Huie's view is found in other elements of the 1913
plan which were allowed to remain; e.g., article 4616, which still
exempted these items from the husband's debts, and article 4623,
which implied that the wife had control by stating that these items
would be liable for her debts. Further support for Huie's view is
found in the recent case of Bearden v. Knight," in which the
Supreme Court held revenues from the wife's separate lands exempt
from the husband's debts and stated that the only purpose of the
1929 legislation was to conform to Arnold v. Leonard. The Court
further stated that the wife had the sole right to control and disposi-
tion of the revenue because it was necessary for her full enjoyment
of her separate land." This reaffirmed the earlier view of the Court
in Gohlman Lester & Co. v. Whittle,"' which held the wife liable on
her contract to sell cotton grown on her separate land.
The Bearden case left unsolved three major problems regarding the
use of the wife's revenues raised by the omission of 1929. The 1957
legislation will probably solve only the first of them.
(1) Considerable trouble was encountered under the 1913 statute
because the exemption section (which remains today as article 4616)
listed only rents from realty and income from securities as exempt
from the husband's debts.' The question was raised whether or not
this listing was exclusive or merely illustrative. If it were exclusive
then she would have no effective control over other types of revenues
from realty and income from personalty other than securities, since
they could be bound by the acts of the husband."° In interpreting
"rents" to include other revenues from land, Bearden cleared up part
of the problem. The 1957 revision to article 4616 evidently solved
the remaining question of income from personalty by amending the
statute to exempt "revenues from her separate property."'" (Em-
phasis added.) The exemption statutes do not expressly establish
control of these items in the wife, but they do negative any effective
4 149 Tex. 108, 228 S.W.2d 837 (1950).
47 Id. at 120, 228 S.W.2d at 843.
48 114 Tex. 548, 273 S.W. 808 (1925).
"'Tex. Rev. Civ. Star. art. 4621 (1911), as amended, Tex. Gen. Laws 1913, c. 32,
p. 61, 16 Gammel, Laws of Texas 61 (1913). Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 4616 was amended
in 1958 to read "revenue from her separate property . ..."
" The following types of the wife's income have been held subject to the husband's
debts: revenue from the wife's separate copyright, Simmons v. Sykes, 56 S.W.2d 193 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1932) error dism.; income from her separate business, Hardee v. Vincent, 136
Tex. 99, 147 S.W.2d 1072 (1941); cotton grown on separate land, First Nat'l Bank v.
Davis, 5 S.W.2d 753 (Tex. Comm. App. 1928). The Davis case was expressly overruled
in Bearden v. Knight, 149 Tex. 108, 228 S.W.2d 837 (1950).
"Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 4616 (1925), as amended, Tex. Gen. & Spec. Laws 1957,
c. 407, p. 1234.
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control by the husband since he cannot offer them to his creditors as
security.
(2) The further problem is presented as to whether property pur-
chased with these revenues is exempt since the 1913 act and subse-
quent legislation were silent on the question. The legislature may
have thought tracing would be applied here as in other areas of the
law thus making further legislation unnecessary." No single rule
can be drawn from the cases. In Hawkins v. Britton State Bank,"
farming equipment purchased with rents from the wife's separate
land was held to be under the control of the wife and exempt
from the husband's debts on the ground that the equipment was
necessary for complete control and enjoyment of her separate land.
Later, however, in Strickland v. Wester," the Court held that person-
al earnings converted into realty were subject to his debts. Strickland
did not purport to overrule Hawkins but cited it favorably in the
opinion." Distinction is possible on three theories. (a) Strickland
may be limited to cases where the wife converts her personal earn-
ings." This element will be discussed in more detail under the subse-
quent section dealing with personal earnings. (b) Strickland may mean
that whenever lands are purchased, whether with revenues or earn-
ings, they are not exempt and thus are under the control of the
husband. This is in line with Texas cases which seem to recognize
only one type of community property when lands are being con-
veyed." No logical distinction between land and personalty is ap-
parent, however. (c) The Strickland and Hawkins cases may mean
that when any type of income is converted, the purchased property,
in order to be exempt, must be essential to the control and use of the
wife's separate property." Thus, the purchase of lands would not
usually be necessary to the effective use of her separate property, as
would such items as farming equipment. However, a court of civil
appeals recently held in Mercantile National Bank v. Wilson" that
bonds purchased with the income from a wife's separate trust were
exempt from the husband's debts in spite of urgings that the Strick-
2 Love v. Robertson, 7 Tex. 6 (1851); Huie, supra note 7, at IX; Emery, Mutations,
4 Sw. L.J. 123 (1950).
53 122 Tex. 69, 52 S.W.2d 243 (1932), 11 Tex. L. Rev. 391 (1933); contra, Chandler
v. Alamo Mfg. Co., 140 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940), 19 Tex. L. Rev. 204 (1940);
Marshall v. Smith, 199 S.W.2d 555 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946).
54 131 Tex. 23, 112 S.W.2d 1047 (1939).
5 Id. at 25, 122 S.W.2d at 1048.
'6 Huie, supra note 45, at 636; Comment, 4 Sw. L.J. 88, 94 (1950); 34 Tex. L. Rev.
477 (1956).
" See note 164 infra and accompanying text.
s Huie, supra note 45, at 636; Huie, supra note 7, at 41.
59279 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) error ref. n.r.e., 34 Tex. L. Rev. 477 (1956).
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land case required a different result since purchase of these bonds
was not essential to the management of her separate property, viz.,
the trust. If this case is followed it would seem to negative the rule
that the item purchased must be necessary to the use of her separate
property and limit the Strickland holding to instances where she
either buys any type of property with her personal earnings or uses
any type of income to buy land.
(3) Since the revenues of the wife's separate property and many
of the items purchased therewith are beyond effective control of the
husband because they are not liable for his debts, it is logical to in-
quire as to the scope of the wife's control. This depends primarily
on the extent of her power to contract regarding such property.
It will be recalled that the wife can contract where necessary to
the preservation and control of her separate property and in such a
case this property (unless otherwise exempt) would be subject to
execution to satisfy a judgment. Evidently, on such a contract the
revenues of the property are also bound although there is little
authority expressly so holding. In Womack v. Womack" the Court
stated that where a judgment was entered on such a contract the
court would order execution first on the income and if this is insuffi-
cient, then on the corpus. Article 4623 seems to be directed at this
question, stating: "Neither the separate property of the husband nor
the community property other than the personal earnings of the
wife, and the income, rents and revenues from her separate property,
shall be subject to the payment of debts contracted by the wife. .. ."
(Emphasis added.) In the Bearden case the Court stated that a cor-
rect interpretation of article 4623 was that it subjected rents and
revenues to liability on her "valid contracts."'" A contract necessary




Recent cases generally have taken a liberal view of what contracts
are necessary to the effective control over her separate estate." It is
clear that a contract for the disposition of the revenues from separate
property (at least from separate land) is enforceable against the wife
as necessary to her control." Thus, she can turn crops and other
6"8 Tex. 397 (1852); Gohlman, Lester & Co. v. Whittle, 254 S.W. 595 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1923), rev'd, 114 Tex. 548, 273 S.W. 808 (1925) (both courts sustaining fore-
closure on cotton grown on separate property). See also Haynes v. Stovall, 23 Tex. 625(1859).
61 149 Tex. at 120, 228 S.W.2d at 844.
62 Note 26 supra and accompanying text.
63Note 35 supra and accompanying text. But cf. cases cited note 117 infra.
64Bearden v. Knight, 149 Tex. 108, 228 S.W.2d 837 (1950); Gohlman, Lester & Co.
v. Whittle, 114 Tex. 548, 273 S.W. 808 (1925); Speer, op cit. supra note 1, at § 199.
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such revenue into cash by valid contract. Logically, a contract to
trade crops for assets other than cash would be equally valid. If she
acquires cash she can purchase any variety of items in an executed
cash transaction." The question arises in the credit purchase-an
executory contract.
Such a contract can be (1) connected with the control of her
separate estate, (2) related to the betterment and preservation of her
special community estate, or (3) not connected with either. The
first situation seems to fall within the language of the Bearden case
and the contract should be binding." Discussion of the second tran-
saction assumes that she has acquired assets (unconnected with her
separate estate) with special community funds in a cash transaction
or by electing to perform under a voidable contract. The Strickland
case indicates that if land is purchased with special community
funds, the wife cannot make a binding contract in connection there-
with inasmuch as the husband has control. On the other hand, the
Wilson case indicates that at least personal property (in that case
bonds) is beyond the husband's control and logically must be under
the wife's control. This case opens up a new dimension to the wife
and, if carried to its logical conclusion, could restore the powers the
wife had under the control provisions in the act of 1913." Concern-
ing the third situation, statements in cases and in legal periodicals
that the wife has "sole control and disposition of revenues"" could
be taken to mean that she can make a valid contract of any kind so
long as there is an understanding that revenue alone will be looked to
to satisfy the contract. This would seem to admit a general contract-
ual power in the wife; however, the many cases which hold that she
can contract only in connection with her separate property clearly
negative such an idea."' The word "disposition" is probably used
in such context to refer only to executed transactions, i.e., sales and
"Pitts v. Elser, 87 Tex. 347, 28 S.W. 518 (1894); Fine v. Lutz, 278 S.W.2d 889
(Tex. Civ. App. 1955) error ref. n.r.e.; Rutherford v. Alamo Abstract & Title Co., 185
S.W.2d 498 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) error dism.; Garner v. Jones, 81 S.W.2d 536 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1935) error dism.; Speer, op. cit. supra note 1, at § 215, 225; Cf. Austin v.
United Credits Corp. 268 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954). A discussion of the ques-
tion of returning items received when the wife rescinds the contract is outside the scope
of this Comment.
"Bearden v. Knight, 149 Tex. at 120, 228 S.W.2d at 844 (1950). See also Hawkins v.
Britton State Bank, 122 Tex. 69, 52 S.W.2d 243 (1932).
6Even the 1913 acts did not provide for her control over items purchased with spe-
cial community funds, although it is probable that such control was intended. See note
168 infra and accompanying text.
"Bearden v. Knight, 149 Tex. 108, 120, 228 S.W.2d 837, 843-44 (1950); Comment,
4 Sw. L.J. 88, 95 (1950); Comment, 25 Tex. L. Rev. 657, 660 (1947).
6" John F. Grant Lumber Co. v. Jones, 139 Tex. 647, 164 S.W.2d 1019 (1942);
Whitney Hardware Co. v. McMahan, 111 Tex. 242, 231 S.W. 694 (1921); Red River
Nat'l Bank v. Ferguson, 109 Tex. 287, 206 S.W. 923 (1918).
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conveyances, and the word "control" used to mean all powers other
than the right to contract."0
Because of this uncertainty as to the wife's power to bind revenues
from separate property, she is, as a practical matter, unable to invest
her revenue in a credit transaction unless she reinvests it in the
further development of the separate estate. Even if she accumulates
revenues to purchase assets in a cash transaction she may find her-
self, under the rule of the Strickland case, unable to control such
assets and may even lose them to the husband's creditors. The result
is that the wife is encouraged to squander her funds rather than to
invest them wisely if she wishes to ensure that such revenue will be
free from the husband's creditors.
4. Respecting Personal Earnings
As noted earlier," statutory authority for the wife's control over
her personal earnings disappeared in 1925 when the attempt to con-
vert revenues to separate property failed. Since control over person-
al earnings usually is not related or necessary to the man-
agement and use of the wife's separate property (although she could
use them to benefit this estate), it is more difficult to establish a
basis for this control than for her control over revenues from her
separate property. If any statutory authority remains, it is in article
4616, which continues to exempt personal earnings from the hus-
band's debts, and article 4623 which purports to make them liable
for her debts (without stating what kind).
In Pottorf v. J. D. Adams Co.7 a court of civil appeals observed
that the provision for her control of earnings was no longer in the
statute and held that a contract of a married woman in regard to
her personal earnings was void. As it is now established that mar-
ried women's contracts are only voidable at their option, the case
is based on an erroneous premise, and Professor Huie feels that it
offers little authority. 3
The decisive setback for women's rights to control their earnings
came in Strickland v. Wester" where, as will be recalled, the Court
held that a creditor of the husband could reach personal earnings of
the wife when they had been invested in land. Her management
powers were not discussed but such a limitation on the exemption
statute (article 4616) negatives any effectual control or use of her
70 These powers are listed in Kultgen, supra note 45, at 338.
" Note 18 supra and accompanying text.
7270 S.W.2d 745 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) error ref.
"8 Leake v. Saunders, 126 Tex. 69, 84 S.W.2d 993 (1935); Huie, supra note 7, at XL.
74131 Tex. 23, 112 S.'W.2d 1047 (1938).
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earnings. The Court's'only statement was that its conclusion had
been reached after "careful consideration;"" s thus, it is not known if
the omission in the 1925 revision was regarded as crucial as it was in
Pottorf. The Hawkins case was not expressly overruled and, as pre-
viously mentioned, reconciliation is possible either on the basis of the
different source from which the property came (revenue or earn-
ings), the type of property purchased, or on the relationship of the
property purchased to her separate property.' The Strickland case
is generally thought to mean at least that she has no power to con-
trol and contract with regard to her personal earnings and that they
are subject to the husband's debts when converted."
Professor Huie feels that the reasoning in Bearden v. Knight is
contra to that in Pottorf and will lead to the overruling of the lat-
ter and that Strickland should be overruled." The writer feels that
both cases should at least be limited to their fact situations. In both,
the wife was dealing with the husband to the potential detriment of
third-party creditors of the husband. Overruling or sharply limit-
ing these cases would be in accord with the 1913 plan to give the
wife control over income produced by her property or her efforts.
Vestiges of this plan are still in the statutes and diversions from it
came through legislative errors committed while trying to increase
the wife's rights rather than decrease them. The wife's earnings
would be bound on a contract for necessaries,' and it is possible that
her earnings are bound when she contracts in connection with her
separate property but no such holding has been found. This con-
clusion is based upon reading the provision of article 4623, provid-
ing that earnings and revenues are subject to her debts, as meaning
they are liable for authorized debts, viz., contracts in connection
with her separate property."0 If this is correct, then, contrary to
popular belief, she does have a limited control of earnings.
The practical effect of the cases, however, is that a merchant ex-
tending credit to a wife for a non-necessary item (assuming the
1957 amendments make no change) and relying on her future per-
sonal earnings for payment should require the husband's joinder as
a party to the contract. His signature will bind not only the general
" Id. at 25, 112 S.W.2d at 1048.
7" Note 56 supra and accompanying text.
"
7Kultgen, supra note 45, at 344; Comment, 4 Sw. L.J. 88, 98 (1950).
78 Huie, supra note 45, at 637.
"' All property of the husband and wife is liable in such cases. See notes 37, 41 supra.
8"In Bearden v. Knight, 149 Tex. 108, 228 S.W.2d 837 (1950), the Court stated
that such property was liable on her "valid contracts." This interpretation of article 4623
gives it some meaning without necessitating the conclusion that it makes her special com-
munity liable for all debts-which could turn it into a general emancipation statute.
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community and his separate property but under the Strickland case
will also enable the creditor to reach the wife's earnings which have
been converted into other assets. It is not certain whose signature
will authorize levy against her personal earnings still in the form of
cash.81 Article 4616 states that they are not liable for the husband's
debts, and the cases negative the wife's control and thus her ability
to bind them, with a possible exception when she is contracting in
connection with her separate estate.
The practice of requiring the husband's joinder in a contract
seeking to bind the wife's personal earnings may be one of the
sources of the misconception that the husband's joinder increases the
contractual power of the wife.8" Opinions have been expressed that
when both parties sign, her earnings are bound - thus imposing an
area of joint control in the Texas law. No case has been found,
however, holding that with his signature she can be bound on a con-
tract otherwise unauthorized (the suretyship contract being a stat-
utory exception requiring joinder). Where the wife is authorized
to contract, the rights are vested in her alone, and when her husband
joins her his property is bound, but she is liable only if it is a type
contract she is authorized to make in her own right.8 The true effect
of the husband's signature is only that it binds his separate property,
the general community, and, under the Strickland case, certain prop-
erty bought with special community funds. If his signature en-
larged the areas of contract open to the wife, then a system of joint
control would be in effect although no Texas statute has ever ex-
pressed the purpose of creating an area of joint control in the law,
and such a system would be cumbersome and undesirable."
The only statute readable as implying joint control is article 4621:
"The community property of the husband and wife shall not be
liable for debts . . . resulting from contracts of the wife except for
necessaries . . . unless the husband joins in the execution of the con-
tract." (Emphasis added.) This wording could be interpreted to
mean that the wife's earnings and revenues as part of the community
property can be bound in any case when the husband joins, but there
has been no such holding.8 ' Article 4621 in this form was passed in
1917 as a component of the legislation which attempted to convert
8 5Comment, 4 Sw. L.J. 88, 98 (1950).
"Comment, 4 Sw. L.J. 208, 216 (1950).
83 Speer, op. cit. supra note 1, at § 173; id. at 216.
84 Kultgen, supra note 45, at 350.
83Durian v. Curl, 155 Tex. 377, 286 S.W.2d 929 (1956), held one half the general
community liable on a contract of the wife. This type case has been criticized in Com-
ment, 7 Texas L. Rev. 615 (1929).
1959]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
revenues from her separate property into separate property."6 Judge
Speer makes the impressive argument that the phrase was merely the
ambiguous result of an attempt to make abundantly clear that what
then remained of the general community property could be bound
only by the husband's act, whether by himself or together with his
wife."7 Subsection (b) of article 4614, as amended in 1957, provides
that when the wife files her election she may then "in her own
name contract and be contracted with, sue and be sued without the
joinder of her husband . . . ." (Emphasis added.) The joinder
phrase evidently refers only to her right to sue and be sued, which
has required his joinder since 1840,8 and should not be taken to
mean that if she does not file, his joinder in contracts will be required.
Pottorf is the only case directly limiting the wife's use of her earn-
ings, but Strickland has had the same practical effect. The unfortu-
nate result of the statutory omission and the subsequent cases is not
only that the wife is restricted in the use of funds which have come
to her-frequently by much greater personal effort than did her
separate property and its revenues-but also that a serious question
is presented whether anyone can contract to use these funds.'
5. As A Surety
Prior to the 1957 amendments, article 4623 provided:'0
Neither the separate property of the husband nor the community
property other than the personal earnings of the wife, and the income,
rents and revenues from her separate property, shall be subject to the
payment of debts contracted by the wife, except those contracted for
necessaries furnished her or her children. The wife shall never be the
joint maker of a note or a surety on any bond or obligation of another
without the joinder of her husband with her in making such contract."
In the 1957 amendments the last sentence regarding suretyship was
dropped from the article. The effect of the omission, of course, de-
pends on the effect of the provision before it was omitted, i.e., wheth-
er it granted the wife an original power to make any type surety-
ship contract when the husband joined, or only limited her already
86 Tex. Gen. Laws 1917, c. 194, p. 436, 18 Gammel, Laws of Texas 436 (1917).
87 Speer, op. cit. supra note 1, at § 169.
"SActs of 1846, 2 Gammel, Laws of Texas 1669 (1898); Acts of 1840, 2 Gammel,
Laws of Texas 177, S 9 (1898).
" Inability of the wife to control her earnings could cause difficulty when she goes into
business. See note 112 infra and accompanying text.
'0 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 4623 (1925).
" The statute only restricts the wife when she puts herself in the position of a surety;
thus, she could transfer a note, but she would not be liable on her endorsement. Pruitt v.




existing powers (to contract for necessaries and to manage her sepa-
rate estate) by requiring the husband's joinder when the contract
happened to be of this type.
When originally passed as part of the sweeping revision of 1913,
the provision which is now article 4623 began: "The wife may
make any contract which she would be authorized to make but for
her marriage except those herein and elsewhere forbidden . .. ."
This was followed by the provision set out above regarding non-
liability of the husband and the prohibition on suretyship. To avoid
a veto by the governor, the bill was recalled and the first sentence
granting the wife unlimited power was stricken, leaving the act
without an express grant of contractural power.92 The provision re-
garding suretyship contracts was thus originally intended as a limita-
tion on the preceding extension of her power, but there now re-
mained nothing to limit.d
In Red River National Bank v. Ferguson"' and Lee v. Hall Music
Co.,"s the Supreme Court by dictum stated that article 4623 was an
original grant of power for a wife to become surety for another
when she was joined by her husband. Judge Speer, writing in 1929,
felt that in spite of this dictum the proviso limited only what power
she already had, and that, therefore, with or without the proviso
she could make suretyship contracts only where she could make
any other contract, viz., for necessaries and in connection with her
separate property." Support for this view is found in Wilson v.
Dearborn,"7 where a court of civil appeals held that the wife could
not be a surety on a bond even with the husband's consent unless it
was for necessaries or for her separate property. But in Cockrell v.
State," the court of criminal appeals adopted the view that it was a
grant of original power and held that the wife could become a surety
for another's bail bond. Such action would not ordinarily be within
her power to contract for necessaries or for her separate property. In
the recent case of Tolbert v. Standard Accident Ins. Co.," the
Supreme Court stated that article 4623, which granted the power to
-the wife to become a surety, should be interpreted narrowly and
"' Note 14 supra and accompanying text.
93Speer, op. cit. supra note 1, at § 183.
"Red River Nat'l Bank v. Ferguson, 109 Tex. 287, 295, 206 S.W. 923, 927 (1918).
11 119 Tex. 147, 35 S.W.2d 685 (1931); Comment, 4 Sw. L.J. 107, 109 (1950).
96 Speer, op. cit. supra note I at § 183; accord, 23 Tex. Jur., Husband and Wife § 175
(1932).
97 179 S.W. 1102 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915).
"88 Tex. Crim. Rep. 525, 228 S.W. 1097 (1921). This interpretation was assumed
to be the rule in Coleman v. State, 116 Tex. Crim. Rep. 46, 28 S.W.2d 144 (1930).
go 148 Tex. 235, 223 S.W.2d 617 (1949).
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therefore did not authorize the wife to become an indemnitor. The
facts seem to indicate that the contract was neither for necessaries
nor for her separate property and thus, according to Speer's view,
she could not have bound herself with or without the husband's
joinder either as an indemnitor or a surety.
If the courts continue to reason that article 4623 granted to the
wife an original power, then the 1957 amendment omitting this
phrase logically must be held to have relieved her of the right ever
to become a surety. Under the better veiw of Judge Speer and the
Wilson case, however, the omission only removes the requirement
of joinder of the husband, and the wife can make surety contracts
in any situation in which she has power to make any other contract.
Situations calling upon the wife to become a surety in order to pre-
serve her separate estate or purchase necessaries would probably be
rare, but the need for such power could arise, and she should not
lose any potential advantage by such an absolute prohibition.
It should be noticed that the removal of the requirement of the
husband's joinder in the 1957 act is unconditional and is not depend-
ent upon her filing an election under article 4614. Sections 199 and
200 of the Probate Code,' allowing her to make bond when acting
as an executrix, administratrix, or guardian, evidently envisioned her
as the principal and not as a surety, and these sections of the code
should be considered a limited extension of her power to contract.
B. After Removal of Disabilities Under Article 4626
1. Scope of Article 4626
In 1911, when the power of the wife to contract was negligible,
the act which is today article 4626 was passed to enable the wife to
engage in business affairs.'' It facilitated her trading by ensuring
creditors that she would not be allowed to plead her coverture and
disaffirm her contracts. The statute does not express the breadth of
the contractual power granted her, stating only that the ". . . said
court shall enter its decree declaring said married woman feme
sole for mercantile or trading purposes, and thereafter she may, in
her own name, contract and be contracted with . . . ." Two questions
arise: (1) Did article 4626 intend to limit permissible contracts to
those for mercantile or trading purposes and thus limit the wife to
certain fields of business? (2) Were her contractual powers (and
...Tex. Probate Code Ann. §§ 119, 200 (1956).
'O'Tex. Gen. Laws 1911, c. 52, p. 92, 15 Gammel, Laws of Texas 92 (1911). For
details of the procedure for complying with the act, see Comment, 4 Sw. L.J. 199 (1950).
The full text of article 4626 is set out in the Appendix, infra.
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resulting control) extended to the income from her separate busi-
ness?
In answer to the first question, Judge Speer felt that contracts
authorized by the statute should be limited to those made for mer-
cantile and trading purposes.1 2 The only direct holding indicating
the type contract authorized and the nature of the business in which
she can engage under article 4626 is George v. Dupignac"°' where a
court of civil appeals held that she could make "any kind of a
contract" and was not limited to mercantile or trading agreements.
The contract involved was for the purchase of a cow and there
was no evidence that the cow was necessary to the management or
preservation of her separate property. Under this holding the statute
would allow even a non-trader to make an unavoidable contract for
an original acquisition not connected" with her separate estate, a
power otherwise unauthorized."' Other cases have implied that non-
traders such as a woman dentist,"5 a beauty college operator," and
a restaurant owner".7 would have been able to contract had they
complied with article 4626. A fair conclusion is that the courts
favor a broad interpretation placing little or no limitation on the
type of contract executed or business engaged in."'
In seeking to answer the second question, it is significant that
article 4626 states that after removal of the wife's disabilities "all
of her separate property not exempt from execution under the laws
of Texas shall thereafter be subject to her debts . . ." (Emphasis
added.) This clearly implies that items belonging to the special
community-and this would include income from her business-
would not be liable under article 4626. The subsequent 1913 act,
which was applicable to all wives, must be looked to to bind her spe-
cial community property. Thus, the cases of Hawkins and Strickland
are probably useful guides in determining her ability to control and
exempt these items from the husband's debts."' This evidently
means that when she makes a contract not connected with her sepa-
rate estate, a judgment can be taken but will reach only her sepa-
102 Speer, op. cit. supra, at § 290.
"0 273 S.W. 934 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) error ref.
04 Jameson v. Williams, 67 S.W.2d 228 (Tex. Comm. App. 1934); cases cited note 69
supra and accompanying text.
"'. Jesse H. Jones & Co. v. Black, 42 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
"Wyner v. Express Publishing Co., 288 S.W.2d 583 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) error
ref. n.r.e., 34 Texas L. Rev. 1094 (1956).
1
7 Express Publishing Co. v. Levenson, 292 S.W.2d 357 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) error
dism.
... Comment, 4 Sw. L.J. 198, 204 (1950).
19 Id. at 206; Strickland v. Wester, 131 Tex. 23, 112 S.W.2d 1047 (1938); Hawkins v.




rate property, for under this theory she can subject special com-
munity assets to execution only by contracting in connection with
her separate estate. However, George v. Dupignac may have ex-
tended article 4626 to make liable her special community in other
cases also. In that case a court of civil appeals stated that after re-
moval of disabilities "she has the right to make any kind of a con-
tract and she will be bound on any contract that she may thereafter
make, the same as though she were a feme sole.."1  There was no
indication in the case as to what funds the creditor was seeking to
reach, but in view of the broad statement of the court, it is possible
that the case means that her special community will be bound on
a contract which is not connected with her separate property. Such
a contract is clearly not binding on her if she does not comply with
the statute. If this broad statement is followed, then article 4626
does give her additional powers to contract with her special com-
munity property. The case is weak authority, however, in the face
of the implied limitation in article 4626, and it is probable that the
wife who has complied with article 4626, cannot bind this special
community except where she can do so without complying with the
statute, i.e., when contracting in connection with her separate prop-
erty.
Under the Hawkins case the revenues of her business are exempt
from the husband's debts"' after being reinvested in the busi-
ness, but the Strickland case raises serious questions as to that part
of the income attributable to her personal efforts. In certain busi-
nesses, e.g., interior decorating or the practice of law, almost all the
income would fall into the latter category, and serious problems can
arise from this inability of the wife to control all her business income
and make it exempt from the husband's debts. The enterprise of
the wife, like most businesses, is likely to start from a small invest-
ment of her separate property and grow through the reinvestment
of her profits. If the reinvested profits are not exempted entirely
from the husband's debts, she can give only partial security to her
original creditors who relied on the growth of the business for pay-
ment. (Of course, in most cases her business contracts would be
connected with her separate property, thus subjecting revenues and
unconverted earnings to liability.) Neither can the wife plan to con-
tinue as the sole manager, since the husband will eventually become a
110 273 S.W. at 936.
... Revenue from business has not always been exempted from the husband's debts. See
e.g., Walker-Smith Co. v. Coker, 176 S.W.2d 1002 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) error ref. w.o.m.,
but under Bearden v. Knight, 149 Tex. 108, 228 S.W.2d 837 (1950), and the 1957 change
in article 4616, this should at last be clear.
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partner with her.11 This points up the collateral problem which the
Strickland case has raised, i.e., determining what income is capital
revenue and what is attributable to personal efforts of the wife. This
question has long plagued other community property states which
regard revenues from separate property as separate and personal earn-
ings as community."3 Arnold v. Leonard is often commended for
preventing this question from arising in Texas," ' but apparently it
has now arrived in another form.
It frequently happens that a wife who wants to go into business
has no separate property and uses either general or special community
funds as beginning capital. In these circumstances she can, under
present statutes, offer the potential creditor no security. Her com-
pliance with article 4626 can make only her separate property liable
on her contracts and article 4614 (both before and after the 1957
amendments) makes liable her special community only if she is con-
tracting in connection with her separate property. The writer be-
lieves that the general willingness of creditors today to deal with a
wife who has complied with article 4626 is based on an understand-
ing, erroneous under a literal interpretation of the statute, that her
separate property and all the income and assets of the business are
subject to forced sale in case of failure to perform her contract.
Possibly the liberal approach of George v. Dupignac will lead the
courts to reach such a result.
Pending such a holding, to permit article 4626 thoroughly to
perform its function, the following assets should be made subject to
the wife's business contracts by clear legislation to that effect:
(1) All of the wife's separate property, revenue therefrom, and
items purchased with such revenue, whether or not used in the
business.
". Comment, 4 Sw. L.J. 198, 206 (1950). Judge Speer concludes that though the wife
complies with article 4626 it is as a practical matter impossible for her to operate her
business because of the community nature of the profits. Speer, op. cit. supra note 1, at
§ 291. To remain independent of the husband she must "buy for cash or in such a manner
as not to involve her husband's credit. . . . She must not mingle with her own, goods pur-
chased in any way upon her husband's credit, nor with the profits from her own invest-
ment; these are not hers." Speer, op. cit. supra note 1, at § 295. However, the Hawkins
case, decided three years after Speers 1929 edition, would evidently give her control over
revenues reinvested. It is possible that the husband could be regarded as making a continuing
gift to the wife (the income thus becoming her separate property) as in Cauble v. Beaver-
Electra Ref. Co., 115 Tex. 1, 274 S.W. 120 (1925), but Judge Speer regards this as
speculative, Speer op. cit. supra note 1, at § 297. The continuing gift theory is probably
only a fiction designed to give stability to the business dealings of the wife, which could
best be done by statutory amendment.
I" George v. Ransom, 15 Cal. 322 (1860); 3 Vernier, American Family Laws § 178,
at 210 (1935).
114 Huie, The Texas Constitutional Definition of the Wife's Separate Property, 35 Texas
L. Rev. 1054, 1059 (1957); Bobbitt, supra note 9.
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(2) Assets belonging to the general community which are used
in the business with the husband's consent. Under this plan the
wife could offer these assets as security to creditors without their be-
ing converted to separate property, which would require a gift
absolute from the husband to the wife. By thus enabling the wife
to make temporary use of community property the basic purpose
of the act could better be achieved and, at the same time, the com-
munity need not permanently divest itself of needed assets.
(3) Personal earnings of the wife from any source and items pur-
chased therewith.
(4) All income from the business and items purchased therewith,
whether attributable to special community assets or general com-
munity assets on loan to the business, or to the reinvestment of
either of them in the business."'
2. Relation of Article 4626 Powers to Her Right to Contract to
Manage And Use Her Separate Estate.
It will be recalled that case law, beginning in the 1920's, cured
the omission of the 1913 statutes by granting to the wife that con-
tractual power deemed essential to the management and use of her
separate property."' This body of authority would seem to have
foreclosed the issue that a wife can make any contract for the pre-
servation, repair, or even development of her separate estate, realty
or personalty. A line of cases has developed, however, interpreting
article 4626 to be the exclusive method whereby a woman operating
a business can acquire any power to contract."" Under this theory,
contracts otherwise enforceable because in connection with the wife's
separate property have been declared voidable because made for a
mercantile purpose. This view can be traced back to dictum in Red
River National Bank v. Ferguson"' (decided in 1918) which ob-
served that the 1913 legislation had omitted any express provision
granting the wife power to contract. In 1919 a court of civil appeals
in Dickinson v. Griffith Lumber Co."' relied on this dictum and con-
cluded (erroneously as it later developed) that the wife was no
better off contractually than in 1911 and that the article 4626 pro-
cedure was the only way for her to acquire power to contract."' The
"' Reform has also been advocated in a Note, 34 Texas L. Rev. 1094, 1096 (1956).
". Whitney Hardware Co. v. McMahan, 111 Tex. 242, 231 S.W. 694 (1921); See note
26 supra and accompanying text.
". Cases collected in Note, 34 Texas L. Rev. 1094 (1956).
" 8109 Tex. 287, 206 S.W. 923 (1918); Bobbitt, Contractual Powers of Married
Women in Texas, I Texas L. Rev. 281, 289 (1923).
"9213 S.W. 341 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919).
... The courts did read the power to contract into the provision of article 4614, pro-
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Supreme Court made a similar statement in 1936 in Hirshfield & Co.
v. Evans, 121 holding a wife not liable on a contract to replace a
stock of merchandise in her separate store. The Court stated that
since the legislature had set out the way in which a wife could con-
tract for mercantile and trading purposes, the rule of implied ex-
clusion obtained. The line of cases represented by Cauble v. Beaver-
Electra Refining Co."' was not mentioned. Dickinson and Hirsch-
field are still followed by the courts of civil appeals, and no realistic
attempt has yet been made to distinguish Cauble."' Where a distinc-
tion was attempted, the courts have stated the rule of Cauble and
then drawn distinctions on the facts. Thus, a lease of office space in
which to house a wife's equipment for the practice of dentistry..
and a purchase of advertising space to attract students to a wife's
beauty college12' were held not necessary to the management or use
of the wives' separate property. Most of the contracts formerly held
necessary for management and use of a wife's separate estate in-
volved land and not a business, and it has been suggested that a con-
tract connected with separate land will be valid as not within the
mercantile and trading prohibition."" Such a distinction still leaves
Cauble unexplained, since in that case the wife was operating drill-
ing rigs. In a more recent case, Bucek v. Yarborough,27 a court of
civil appeals decided that a wife cannot contract to purchase a build-
ing to be placed on her separate land when there has been no com-
pliance with article 4626. The case would seem to be in direct con-
flict with Levin v. Jeffers."
It appears that the courts have come to regard the wife's man-
agement and use of her separate property as a more or less passive
function, limited to maintenance and upkeep as distinguished from
a dynamic function of promoting growth, which is characteristic of
a profit-making enterprise. The language and the holding in the
Cauble case, if realistically analyzed, defy such limitation. Even if
the Cauble case be completely discounted, the Dickinson line of cases
places an unwarranted restriction on a wife who is attempting mere-
viding for the wife's sole management and control of her separate property. See note 25
supra and accompanying text.
1"1 127 Tex. 254, 93 S.W.2d 148 (1936).
2' 115 Tex. 1, 274 S.W. 120 (1925); Levin v. Jeffers, 122 Tex. 83, 52 S.W.2d 81
(1932); Lewis v. Daniels, 126 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) error dism.
12 See, e.g., Wyner v. Express Publishing Co., 288 S.W.2d 583 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956)
error ref. n.r.e.
"
4 jesse H. James Co. v. Black, 42 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
12 Wyner v. Express Publishing Co., 288 S.W.2d 583 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) error
ref. n.r.e.
'2' Note, 34 Texas L. Rev. 1094, 1095 (1956).
127 313 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
12 122 Tex. 83, 52 S.W.2d 81 (1932).
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ly to manage her separate property wisely. Potential creditors cannot
risk dealing with her because of the possibility that their agreement
might be considered a trading contract and therefore voidable by
her. The Dickinson type cases are thus rapidly undoing what was
done for the wife by the act of 1913 as interpreted by such leading
cases as Cauble, McMahan, and Levin v. Jeffers.
The solution lies in recognizing that the statutory grant in the act
of 1913 to manage her separate estate, both real and personal, is a
broad grant to the wife of power to exercise the customary incidents
of ownership and management, including the development and oper-
ation of her property for maximum return. This right should not
be limited by an earlier statute (1911) which was designed for an
era which passed into history forty-five years ago with the enact-
ment of the 1913 amendments.12
C. After the 1957 Amendments
The impact of the new act on the wife's rights to convey, engage
in lawsuits, and become a surety is discussed in the sections dealing
with those topics and the reader is referred to the appropriate sec-
tions. The full text of the amendments is set out in the appendix.
1. In Regard To Her Separate Property
The provision of article 4614 (b) providing that she can contract
"in connection" with her separate property appears to be only a codi-
fication of the case law built up under old article 4614 which pro-
vided for her sole control and disposition of her separate property."'
The benefits of article 4614 as amended, however, are made condi-
tional upon the wife's being twenty-one years of age and filing a
statement with the county clerk indicating that she wishes to receive
the benefits of the act.1 ' The introduction of this filing and age re-
quirement into article 4614 has posed an important problem of in-
terpretation because the new article 4614 completely replaces the
old provision which will no longer appear in the statutes. Former
article 4614 provided unconditional statutory authority for the
wife's control of her separate property, from which all her powers
of contract were derived (except those for necessaries)."' Since the
wife's powers to contract are said to be statutory, the repeal of old
article 4614 by amendment could be interpreted to mean that the
129 See notes 4 and 101 supra and accompanying texts.
1O0 Note 36 supra and accompanying text.
' Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 4614 (1925), as amended, Tex. Gen. & Spec. Laws 1957,
c. 407, p. 1233.
132 See text accompanying note 25 supra.
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wife no longer has control over her separate property unless and un-
til she files her election and that the wife under twenty one has no
control and can obtain none.
The act proposed by the Legislative Council did not contain any
age limits or filing requirements.1"' This form was objectionable to the
sponsor of the amendments as it would "let a fourteen year old girl
marry and the next day throw away her inheritance.""1 ' Under article
4625... (which makes a female minor legally of age upon her mar-
riage) and old article 4614, she had been able to do this since 1913
if the property were not realty or securities (which require the hus-
band's joinder). Nevertheless, upon this justification the amendment
was added requiring her to be twenty-one years of age and to file
her election with the county clerk as a condition to receiving the
benefits of the new article 4614.
These views, expressed by the sponsor of the amendments on the
Senate floor, indicate that in his mind, at least, passage of the amend-
ments would allow adult wives to make binding contracts only after
filing and would allow minor wives no contractual powers under any
circumstances. If new article 4614 does destroy the wife's former
powers, the requirement that the adult wife file before re-acquiring
those powers is troublesome for her but not too onerous; if creditors
who are aware of the changes insist on her filing, she can comply
through a relatively simple and inexpensive procedure."' The burden
would fall upon creditors unaware of the new act who have become
accustomed to dealing with her under her power to contract in re-
gard to the management of her separate estate, as she would, under
this construction of the new act, be able to plead her coverture and
avoid the contract.
The act, under this interpretation, would be much more trouble-
some for a wife under twenty one. Since there would be no pro-
cedure by which she could file and obtain the power available under
133 Suggested Act No. 2, printed in Legal Status of Married Women in Texas, a Report
to the 55th Legislature by the Texas Legislative Council (1956). This proposed act did not
limit her to contracts "in connection" with her separate estate and was supported by many
women's clubs.
134 Statements by Senator Wardlow Lane, Chairman of the State Affairs Committee, as
printed in the Dallas Morning News, "Senate Passes Bill Allowing Women to Control
Estates," April 17, 1957. Apparently the organized women in Texas regard further attempts
to gain equal rights by amendments to existing statutes as "impractical" and will seek to
have the Texas Constitution amended to provide that equality under the law shall not be
denied because of sex. Legal Discriminations Against Women in Texas, prepared by the Tex-
as Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs, Inc. (1958).
13Acts of 1848, 3 Gammel, Laws of Texas 77 (1898).
136 The wife may be put to some expense in securing legal advice since the act does not
specify the form to be used in filing. The act is also silent as to the necessity of the hus-




article 4614, her only remedy would be to resort to article 4626, the
mercantile and trading statute which is a cumbersome and expensive
procedure, involving a petition and hearing in the district court.
Thus, the minor wife with a limited amount of separate property
ordinarily would be unable to make the contracts necessary for its
management and preservation. Her husband could do no better in
the management of her property unless he has sufficient assets of his
own which can be reached by creditors since her separate property
is clearly exempt from his debts. ' Obviously, the legislature could
not have intended such an impasse in the control of property to oc-
cur, ' and thus it undoubtedly intended article 4614 only to pro-
vide a method whereby limited additional powers could be obtained
but not to retract previously existing powers."8 In the case of the
minor wife, it evidently seemed advisable that these additional powers
be unavailable to her.
Two other features of the bill contain impressive evidence that
she was to retain those powers of contract granted in the acts of
1913 without filing under the new act.
(1). Subsection (c) of 4614 as amended in 1957 undertakes to
set out what the result will be if the wife does not file her election
under subsection (d). The husband will be required to join in her
conveyances of realty and transfers of securities - the same limita-
tions found in old article 4614 copied verbatim. Subsection (d) goes
on to say that if she files her election then the limitations in sub-
section (c) will no longer apply. Thus the legislature expressly set
out the restrictions on the wife who does not file her election, and
the only realistic conclusion is that they intended these to be the
only limitations resulting from a failure to file. The fact that they
are the same qualifications imposed upon her by the old law is fur-
ther evidence of an intention that the other powers of the non-filing
wife were to be unchanged by the new amendments. To interpret
the act as extinguishing the contractual rights of the non-filing
wife is to ignore the plain implications of subsection (c) and would
return the wife to her 1911 status."4
0
"'Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat, art. 4616, as amended, Tex. Gen. & Spec. Laws 1957, c. 407,
p. 1234.
.ss Possibly, guardianship was envisioned. Under Tex. Probate Code Ann. 5 109 (1956),
this might give control to her parents which could effectively protect her property but
would certainly not protect her marriage.
... This conclusion was shared by Mrs. Hermine D. Tobolowsky, Legal Advisor for the
Texas Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs, Inc., in a letter to the South-
western Law Journal, September 26, 1958. Mrs. Tobolowsky was present and participated
in the Senate hearings on the bill. See note 134 supra.
... The requirement of the wife having to do something to receive powers would assure
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(2). The broadening of the exemption statutes (articles 4616 and
4623) which are applicable whether or not she files her election, is
in accord with the view that her prior powers are not diminished.
These statutes were modified to make clear that personal earnings
and revenue from all separate property would be exempt from debts
of the husband."1 If the amended article 4614 were interpreted as
returning control of the non-filing wife's property to the husband,
then an outright contradiction must be attributed to the legislature,
for by expanding the exemption statute they effectively prevent his
control.
When the adult wife does file, her power of control is not sub-
stantially increased because her contracts must still be connected
with her separate estate,4 ' but her independence from the husband
is established by the other provisions which eliminate the require-
ment of his joinder in conveyances and in suits.' s
2. In Regard To Her Personal Earnings And Revenues From Separate
Property
No substantial increase in her ability to bind her earnings and
revenues should come from the use of the new words "in connec-
tion" with her separate property, for this appears to be only a codi-
fication of her former judicially given rights. It is doubtful that any
increase will come from the rest of the new act.
The only possible source would be article 4614(b) which pro-
vides: "The community property of the husband and wife, with the
exception of the wife's personal earnings and the revenue from her
separate property, shall never be subject to the payment of debts
contracted by the wife . . . ." This phrase could be read to mean
that these items are to be liable for any debt, thus eliminating the
requirement that her contracts be connected with her property.
However, this same clause has been in article 4623 since 1913'"
without attracting any attention as a possible source for complete
contractural power over these items. The true meaning of the phrase
evidently is that these items will be liable only for her authorized
debts.4 ' If any increase of contractual power is found in this pro-
vision it would result in equal benefit to those who have not filed,
this result. As of October 10, 1958, the deed records of Dallas County indicated only forty-
two such filings.
141 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. arts. 4616, 4623 (1925), as amended, Tex. Gen. & Spec. Laws
1957, c. 407, p. 1233. See text accompanying note 51 supra.
141 See text accompanying note 36 supra.
145 Sections IV and V of this Comment infra.
144 See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
145 See text accompanying note 61 supra.
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since the same provision is still found in article 4623 which does not
contain any filing prerequisite.
3. For Necessaries
The 1957 amendments apparently make no change in the wife's
right to contract for necessaries.
4. In Relation to Powers Acquired Under Article 4626 (Mercantile
& Trading Statute)
The proposal submitted by the Legislative Council would have
specifically repealed article 4626, but as passed the act contains only
a general repealing clause; therefore, article 4626, since it is not in
conflict with the amendment, is not repealed. Under article 4626 the
wife is thought to have greater powers because she is not limited to
contracts in connection with her separate estate."' But, even under
article 4626 it is probable that she can bind her special community
only if the contract is in connection with her separate property."'
No conflict would arise between the two statutes if it were not for
the cases interpreting article 4626 to be the exclusive method for a
business woman to acquire the power to contract.' If the courts
continue to hold article 4626 exclusive, then the ability to contract
made available by article 4614 will be rendered ineffective as a prac-
tical matter. It is difficult enough for a creditor to determine when
a wife is contracting "in connection" with her separate estate with-
out requiring him also to predict at his peril what contracts will fall
within or without the "mercantile and trading" classification.
This line of cases, holding article 4626 to be the exclusive source
of contractual power for a business woman, began due to a lack of
express statutory authority for the wife to contract (Dickinson v.
Griffith Lumber Co.) and the grant of contractual power in arti-
cle 4614 by the 1957 amendments should be sufficient ground for
finding these cases inapplicable when the wife has complied with
article 4614. If, as discussed previously, the new article 4614 were
to be interpreted as relieving the wife of the powers granted in 1913
by setting up filing as a prerequisite to any control over her proper-
ty, then as to wives who do not file, the statement in Red River Na-
tional Bank v. Ferguson,"9 relied on as the basic premise in the Dick-
inson case, would be correct and the Dickinson holding should be
14 See text accompanying note 104 supra.
147 See text accompanying note 110 supra.
140Note 117 supra and accompanying text.
149 213 S.W. 341 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919).
'1o 109 Tex. 287, 206 S.W. 923 (1918).
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followed. If such an unlikely interpretation were adopted, then as
regards non-filing wives Texas will have returned to pre-1913 law.
IV. POWERS OF CONVEYANCE AND TRANSFER
A. Conveyance Of Land
This topic will be discussed under the following headings: (1)
the wife's ability to convey land which is her separate property;
(2) the wife's ability to convey land purchased with special com-
munity funds; (3) her ability to convey land of types (1) and
(2) after removal of her disabilities under article 4626; and (4)
the effects of the 1957 Amendments on her ability to convey land.
1. Conveyance Of Her Separate Lands
Restriction on the wife's power to convey separate lands was im-
posed in 1897 by what is now article 1299: "The husband and wife
shall join in the conveyance of real estate, the separate property of
the wife .. . .... The act of 1913 which gave her "sole management,
control and disposition of her separate property" continued to re-
quire his joinder for such conveyances.""2 The requirement is rigidly
enforced. Thus, where the husband does not join in the conveyance
of her separate realty the deed is not void as to strangers"5' but, evi-
dently, it is completely void as to the wife and her privies on the
theory that the requirement is intended to benefit her by assuring
that she will seek the husband's advice and counsel.""4 Conversely, to
free her as much as possible from domination by the husband, her
separate acknowledgement is required to be taken "privily and
apart.' s As it is a conveyance of her property, the wife must appear
in the deed as a grantor and her signature alone will not pass title.""
If the husband has abandoned her or is insane, she can convey with-
out the husband's joinder after application to the court under article
4617."s' The law does not undertake to describe the purposes for
... Tex. Gen. Laws 1897, c. 40, p. 41, 10 Gammel, Laws of Texas 41 (1897).
"'sTex. Gen. Laws 1913, c. 32, p. 61, 16 Gammel, Laws of Texas 61 (1913). Except
as restricted by statute she can convey as if she were a feme sole, i.e., personal property
other than stocks and bonds. Speer, op. cit. supra note 1, at 5 249.
1
5 3 Buvens v. Brown, 118 Tex. 551, 18 S.W.2d 1057 (1929).
14 Merriman v. Blalack, 121 S.W. 552 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909) error ref.; Speer, op. cit.
supra note 1, at § 227. Some cases have indicated that it was merely voidable by speaking
of subsequent ratification; but, in effect, have required another conveyance. Thompson v.
Crim, 132 Tex. 586, 126 S.W.2d 18 (1939). Cf. Fritz, The Texas Law of Conveyancing,
3 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. 3, 14 (Supp. 1958).
.. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 6605 (1925).
"asStone v. Sledge, 87 Tex. 49, 26 S.W. 1068 (1894).




which she may convey, and in this respect her right of disposition
seems to be unlimited."5 8
2. Conveyance Of Lands Purchased With Special Community Funds
The act of 1913 provided that rents from the wife's real estate
and income from her securities should be "under the control, man-
agement and disposition of the wife alone, subject to the provisions
of article 4621 . . . ,'5 What was then article 4621 contained the
following restrictions, which until the 1957 amendments continued
to appear in article 4614: ". . . provided however, the joinder of the
husband in the manner now provided by law for conveyance of the
separate real estate of the wife [evidently referring to article 1299]
shall be necessary to the incumbrance or conveyance by the wife of
her lands. . . ." Reading article 4621 and the provision giving her
control and disposition together, it is probable that the original in-
tent was to give the wife power to dispose of lands purchased with
her special community funds. The emphasized words in the above-
quoted portion of article 4621 demonstrate that the legislature was
aware of article 1299, which required the husband's joinder in con-
veyances of her separate property and attempted to express an in-
tention that all "her lands" be treated in like manner. Even though
this was evidently the original intent, the writer has found no case
which recognizes that lands could become special community proper-
ty and be treated differently than the general community which may
be conveyed by the husband alone, unless it is homestead.60
As the provision for her control and disposition of revenues and
personal earnings disappeared, her power to convey lands purchased
with such funds apparently disappeared also."" This result would also
follow from the Strickland case,"' which held lands purchased with
personal earnings liable for debts of the husband, since liability for
his debts is certainly inconsistent with power of control and disposi-
tion in the wife. This inability to convey and control lands pur-
chased with special community assets can conflict with her ability
to bind revenues and earnings when she contracts in connection with
her separate estate (discussed under her ability to contract regard-
ing such funds). According to the Hawkins case, 61 a contract suffi-
186 Speer, op. cit. supra note 1, at §§ 224-25, 264.
119Tex. Gen. Laws 1913, c. 32, p. 61, 16 Gammel, Laws of Texas 61 (1913) (art.
4622).
'65Masterson, Marital Property Problems from an Oil and Gas Lessee's Standpoint, 4
Sw. L.J. 151 (1950); Speer, op. cit. supra note 1, at §5 247-48.
16. For an account of the mishaps leading to this disappearance, see the section of this
Comment entitled "History" supra.
162 131 Tex. 23, 112 S.W.2d 1047 (1938).
163 122 Tex. 69, 52 S.W.2d 243 (1932).
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ciently connected with her separate estate will give the wife control
over the thing purchased (in that case, farming equipment). How-
ever, if the wife used special community funds to purchase land on
which to run cattle which were her separate property, the Strickland
rule would allow this land to be conveyed away by the husband's
deed as ordinary community. The inability of the wife to control
and convey community land is demonstrated by the cases dealing
with conveyances which recognize only one type of community
property, viz., general community which is subject to control and
sale by the husband.164 This policy of lumping all community prop-
erty into one category (possibly even though such lands are neces-
sary to the preservation of the wife's separate property) is so firmly
established by case law that it will probably require clear and un-
equivocal legislation for its reversal.
3. Her Power To Convey After Compliance With Article 4626
Article 4626 contained no statement implying a change from pro-
visions of the older article 1299 (requiring the husband's joinder in
conveyances) although it did purport to increase her independent
ability to contract. It is generally thought that his joinder is still
required in her conveyances although she has had her disabilities re-
moved for trading purposes. 6 '
4. Impact Of The 1957 Provisions
Article 4614(c) as amended in 1957 states that if the wife is
under twenty one or fails to file her election with the county clerk,
the joinder of the husband in conveyances and encumbrances of her
lands is required as in prior years. When she does file her election
(and she must be over twenty one to do so) subsection (d) states
that this limitation shall not thereafter apply. Subsection (d) in
conjunction with the general repealing clause of the 1957 amend-
ments should qualify article 1299 so as to make it inapplicable after
she has filed her election. Thus, she is now permitted to convey her
separate lands without the husband's joinder. The new act does not
purport to eliminate the husband's joinder if the separate property
"4Bell v. Crabb, 244 S.W. 371 (Tex. Comm. App. 1922); Griffin v. Troup Independ-
ent School Dist., 163 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) error ref; Delay v. Truitt, 182
S.W. 732 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) error ref.; Speer, op. cit. supra note 1, at § 247. Although
the wife alone is unable to convey community lands, it has been held that the deed is valid
if the husband expressly or impliedly gives his consent. Lockhart v. Garner, -Tex.- 298
S.W.2d 108 (1957); Thomas v. Chance, 11 Tex. 634 (1854). Thus, there are less formal-
ities than in the case of her separate property.
165 Comment, 4 Sw. L.J. 199, 204 (1950).
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is homestead;... neither does it alter her inability to dispose of spe-
cial community lands, as it did not contain any provision recogniz-
ing that lands could become special community.
B. Transfer Of Stocks And Bonds
Prior to 1913 the wife was considered able to make a sole transfer
of personalty,"' but the act of that year required the husband's join-
der in transfers of stocks and bonds, apparently regardless of wheth-
er they were her separate property or purchased with special com-
munity assets. ' Elsewhere the act gave the wife control over her
special community and it may be inferred that the act intended to
extend this joinder requirement to items purchased with special com-
munity funds in view of the following language of article 4621:
"... the joint signature of the husband and wife shall be necessary
to a transfer of stocks and bonds belonging to her or of which she
may be given control by this law." (Emphasis added.)
The repeal of the provisions for the wife's control of her special
community property in 1925 would seemingly relieve her of control
over items purchased with such property, but a portion of her
control was restored by the Hawkins case, at least when the
item purchased is connected with her separate property. However,
in Mercantile National Bank v. Wilson,' bonds purchased with spe-
cial community funds were held to be exempt from the husband's
debts although purchase of the bonds was not found necessary to the
preservation of her separate estate. Thus, the Wilson case adds strong
support to the view that property bought with special community
funds takes on the character of the funds invested17 and therefore
is subject at least to some control by the wife. Logically, such prop-
erty should also be subject to disposition by the wife, for if the hus-
band cannot subject the property to involuntary transfer it is diffi-
cult to imagine that he could make a voluntary transfer. The Strick-
land case as it now stands evidently prevents application of the Wil-
son rule to realty.
Under the 1957 amendments to article 4614, in subsection (c),
the husband's joinder is still required in transfers of stocks and bonds
when the wife does not file her election. If she does file, then under
article 4614(d), subsection (c) is no longer applicable, and the hus-
"'0Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 4618 (1925).
107 Speer, op. ct. supra note I, at S 224.
I" Tex. Gen. Laws 1913, c. 32, p. 61, 16 Gammel, Laws of Texas 61 (1913).
19279 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) error ref n.r.e.
170 Huie, Changes Made by the Texas Probate Code in the Administration of Community
Property, 34 Texas L. Rev. 700, 707 (1956).
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band's joinder no longer required. The question then is, does the
joinder requirement in subsection (c) refer only to stocks and bonds
which are her separate property or also to such special community
property? Subsection (c) is identical with old article 4621, and hav-
ing already concluded that this article, aided by the Wilson case,
extended disposition by the wife to special community stocks and
bonds when joined by the husband, then when the wife files (mak-
ing subsection (c) inapplicable), her powers of disposition remain,
but the husband's joinder is eliminated as to both classes of property.
Assuming the interpretation given the Wilson and Strickland cases
is correct, the following is a brief summary of what and how the
wife can convey.
(1) Land which is the wife's separate property-The wife is the
proper grantor but the husband must join unless she complies with
the filing requirement of article 4614.
(2) Land purchased with special community funds-Such land is a
part of the general community and the husband is the proper grant-
or, but the wife can convey with the husband's consent.
(3) Stocks and bonds (both separate and special community)-The
wife can transfer but the joinder of the husband is required unless
she complies with article 4614.
V. THE WIFE As A PARTY LITIGANT
In the middle nineteenth century, when the husband had general
control over all the property of both spouses, separate and commun-
ity, three procedural provisions were passed requiring the husband's
presence as a party in any lawsuit involving the marital property.
They remain in the law today and are set out below.
A. The Wife As A Defendant
1. Her Separate Property
Article 1985, passed in 1846, provides: "The husband shall be
joined in suits for separate debts and demands against the wife but
no personal judgment shall be rendered against the husband."' 71 In
1848 a more specific provision, article 1984, was passed but did not
repeal article 198 5.171 It provided: "The husband and wife shall be
jointly sued for all debts contracted by the wife for necessaries fur-
nished herself or children, and for expenses which may have been
incurred by the wife for the benefit of her separate property." Fail-
e'Acts of 1846, 2 Gammel, Laws of Texas 1669 (1898).
17 Acts of 1848, 3 Gammel, Laws of Texas 77 (1898).
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lure to join him when required by either statute will result in a void-
able judgment"3 unless he has abandoned her or is incapacitated."
A pro forma joinder will be sufficient, however.' The wife is a nec-
essary party to any action seeking to reach her separate property and
she would not be bound if the husband were sued alone.'
As the husband is the primary obligor on contracts for neces-
saries furnished the wife and children, his separate property and the
general community are liable,"" and the requirement of his joinder
is logical since, as a practical matter, the creditor would join him
anyway. As he is not liable on her other contracts, the requirement
of his joinder is supported only by the argument that he will pro-
vide advice and counsel. It would seem, however, that if he were dis-
posed to give advice he would offer as much voluntarily as he would
when joined pro forma. The 1913 legislation was based on the as-
sumption that the wife was competent to manage her separate estate
and the continuation of the ancient idea of her incompetency and
the necessity of his joinder in litigation seems inconsistent.7 The
suggestion has frequently been made that the joinder requirements
be repealed.'"
2. The General Community
In suits which seek to reach the general community, the husband
is a necessary party defendant,' 0 and judgment against the wife alone
on a debt of the community is voidable.'"' It has been held that the
wife is an improper party if the contract sued upon is not for nec-
essaries or in connection with the wife's separate property as the
judgment would wrongfully jeopardize her separate property.'"' If
the general community property is homestead (and that plea would
... City of Dallas v. Morris. 120 Tex. 181, 36 S.W.2d 702 (1931); Straus v. Shamblin,
120 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) error dism., 17 Texas L. Rev. 496 (1939); Twin
City Lumber & Shingle Co. v Williams, 110 S.W.2d 596 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
'
4 Lee v. Hall Music Co., 119 Tex. 547, 552, 35 S.W.2d 685, 687 (1931); Speer, op.
cit. supra note 1, at § 523.
'7'Nash v. George, 6 Tex. 234 (1851); Booth v. Cotton, 13 Tex. 359 (1855); Com-
ment, 29 Texas L. Rev. 233, 242 (1950).
178Wilson v. Johnson, 94 Tex. 272, 60 S.W. 242 (1900); Ferguson v. Kuehn, 246 S.W.
674 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922).
17 Note 41 supra and accompanying text.
178 Judge Speer concluded in Tannehill v. Tannehill, 171 S.W. 1050 (Tex. Civ. App.
1914), that the 1913 legislation did not repeal the earlier joinder statutes.
1 Kultgen, supra note 45 at 361; Comment, 29 Texas L. Rev. 233, 242 (1950). Repeal
was also proposed in suggested act No. 2 submitted by the legislative council (except as to
contracts for necessaries). See note 133 supra.
180Nichols v. Oliver, 64 Tex. 647 (1885); Ohmart v. Highbarger, 43 S.W.2d 975
(Tex. Civ. App. 1931) error ref.; Speer, op. cit. supra note 1, at S 524.
... Taylor v. Hustead & Tucker, 257 S.W. 232 (Tex. Comm. App. 1924).
... Walling v. Hannig, 73 Tex. 580, 11 S.W. 547 (1889); Shelby v. Perrin, 18 Tex.
515 (1857); Comment, 29 Texas L. Rev. 233, 242 (1950).
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be a good defense), the wife must be joined or the judgment does
not bind her. "' Similarly, she is a proper party in other situations,
e.g., when suit is against the husband's executors or in trespass to try
title."'
3. Wife's Special Community
No serious problem should be posed as to who are the necessary
and proper party defendants when the plaintiff desires to levy on
special community assets. The writer has found no case drawing a
clear distinction between special and general community property,
but different treatment is logically required, since article 4616 ex-
empts the special community from the husband's debts.'8 The prop-
erty can hardly be exempt from his debts if it is subject to levy
under judgments against him alone, and we may fairly conclude that
the wife is a necessary party as in the case of her separate property.
Of course, the Strickland case engrafts on article 4616 an exception
in the case of income converted to land and/or personal earnings
converted into property. With regard to the necessity of joining
the husband in suits seeking to reach special community assets,
articles 1984 and 1985,18 although passed prior to the creation of
the special community in 1913, seem to require the husband's joinder
(at least pro forma) in the only types of suits which can reach such
property, viz., suits on contracts for neccessaries, contracts made in
connection with her separate property, and actions for her torts."'
judgment so rendered, but the statute mentions only her separate
4. Article 4626
A wife who has complied with article 4626 and has been declared
a feme sole for mercantile and trading purposes may sue and be sued
alone."" The cases do not indicate the extent of her liability on a
':3 Speer, op. cit. supra note 1, at S 522; 23 Tex. Jur., Husband and Wife 5 287 (1932).
" 'Moore v. Follett, 11 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) error dism.; Vela v. Shack-
lett, 1 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
"8'Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 4616 (1925), as amended, Tex. Gen. & Spec. Laws 1957,
c. 407, p. 1234.
' Acts of 1848, 3 Gammel, Laws of Texas 77 (1898); Acts of 1846, 2 Gammel, Laws
of Texas 1669 (1898). The husband has a one-half property interest in such case which
would be an added reason to require him to be joined.
187 A judgment on a pre-marital contract of the wife would undoubtedly reach special
community property since in such a case even the general community is liable. Crim v.
Austin, 6 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. Comm. App. 1928). Joinder of the husband seemingly would
be required in this case also because it comes within the broad catch-all phrase "separate
debts and demands," of Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 1985 (1925). Of course, a judgment
could be entered against a married woman on other grounds if she failed to plead her
coverture, but the words in article 1985 appear to be all inclusive and if the husband were
not joined, the judgment would be voidable. Cases cited note 173 supra.
18' Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 4626 (1925); Comment, supra note 101.
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property as liable. If the statute is interpreted literally, the only
way to acquire a judgment over her plea of coverture which would
reach special community property would be to allege a contract for
necessaries or in connection with her separate property, in which
case article 1984 requires joining the husband.
5. 1957 Amendments
Article 4614 as amended in 1957, in speaking of the separate
property of the wife who has filed her election, provides ". . . . and
in connection therewith, she may, in her own name, contract and be
contracted with, sue and be sued, without the joinder of her husband
and her coverture shall not be a defense in any suit or action based
on such contracts." (Emphasis added.) Undoubtedly, the term
'such contracts" includes contracts for the benefit of her separate
estate,1" and if she files her election, article 1984 is rendered pro
tanto ineffective, and the husband need no longer be joined. If the
contract is one for necessaries, article 4614 does not purport to make
any change, and the husband must be joined under article 1984, a
reasonable requirement since he is the primary obligor. Apparently,
a suit against the wife alone when she has filed her election would
reach special community as well as separate property."' Such an in-
terpretation would be desirable, for if this part of the act is to be
of any practical value in eliminating the necessity for the husband's
joinder, the judgment against the wife alone must authorize levy
against as much property as when the husband is joined, viz., special
community as well as separate property.
B. The Wife As A Plaintiff
1. Her Separate Property
Limitation was placed on the wife's ability to sue for recovery of
her separate property by article 1983 in 1840, providing: "The hus-
band may sue either alone or jointly with his wife for the recovery
of the separate property of the wife; and in case he fails or neglects
so to do, she may sue alone by authority of the court"''... The hus-
band may bring the suit with or without the joinder of the wife,
but she is a necessary party if his interests conflict with hers."" If
9 See text accompanying note 31 supra.
.. Section (b) of article 4614, Tex. Gen. & Spec. Laws 1957, c. 407, p. 1234, states
that her separate property is subject to levy and execution, but the following sentence
clearly implies that her special community is liable also.
1"1 Acts of 1840, 2 Gammel, Laws of Texas 177, S 9 (1898).
10 Hugo v. Seffel, 92 Tex. 414, 49 S.W. 369 (1899); Texas and Pacific Ry. Co. v.
Medaris, 64 Tex. 92 (1885); White v. Blalock, 199 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
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he refuses to sue, abandons her, is unable to sue, or if she complies
with article 4626 and has her disabilities removed, she may sue
alone. ' Otherwise, the husband is a necessary party, but it is now
clear that the wife in suing to recover her separate property need
join the husband only pro forma.5 "
2. The General Community
Although there is no statutory rule, the courts generally have re-
garded the husband as the only proper party to sue to recover the
community property, and the wife as neither a necessary nor proper
party."' It has been held, however, that his joinder pro forma tolls
the statute of limitation.'" In any event, his failure to sue does not
authorize her to proceed alone unless he has abandoned her, is in-
competent, or has conflicting interests."
3. The Wife's Special Community
There seems to be no authority recognizing a possible distinction
based on injury to her special community property. As in the cases
where the wife was the defendant, the decisions have spoken of only
one community; if the husband did not desire to sue, his decision
was final, subject to the exceptions stated above.
4. The 1957 Amendments
The 1957 amendments to article 4614 make it clear that when
the wife files her election she can sue without the husband's joinder
"in connection" with her separate property.' Logically, this power
should extend to contracts concerning the production of revenue
from the separate property, the disposition of such revenue, and the
purchase of property necessary to the management and control of
her separate estate, for her ability to sue and make the final decisions
in the conduct of such suits is an essential ingredient in the complete
control of her separate property.
... Norton v. Davis, 83 Tex. 32, 18 S.W. 430 (1892); Crenshaw v. Newell, 147
S.W.2d 523 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) error ref.; Speer, op. cit. supra note 1, at § 510.
'"Van v. Webb, 147 Tex. 299, 215 S.W.2d 151 (1948).
19Wade v. Wade, 140 Tex. 339, 167 S.W.2d 1008 (1943); Jordan v. Moore, 65 Tex.
363 (1886); Johnson v. Daniel Lumber Co., 249 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) error
ref. However, there is dicta to the effect that the wife can recover community property
with only a pro forma joinder of the husband. Pacific Greyhound Lines v. Tuck, 217
S.W.2d 699 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) error ref. n.r.e.; Houston Elec. Co. v. Potter 51
S.W.2d 754 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) error dism.; Comment 29 Texas L. Rev. 233, 240
(1950).
"'sPacific Greyhound Lines v. Tuck, supra note 195.
.. Ezell v. Dodson, 60 Tex. 331 (1883); Comment, 29 Texas L. Rev. 233, 239 (1950).




The accomplishments of the 1957 legislation can be classified un-
der three headings: (1) elimination of the necessity of the husband's
joinder in the wife's conveyances, surety contracts, and suits; (2)
codification of the wife's existent contractual powers; and (3)
streamlining of the statutes exempting her property from the debts
of the husband.
The second and third categories of achievement are significant be-
cause they make it easier to ascertain and apply the legal rules per-
taining to the wife's powers. The first category is the most signifi-
cant because it effects basic changes in the substantive law in this
field and, as discussed later, lays a foundation for possible future
substantive changes. Of course, the requirement that the wife file
her election before receiving most of the benefits of the new act
prevents blanket extension of these benefits to all married women,
but it hardly can be said to prevent their acquisition by any adult
wife with a moderate interest in receiving them. On the other hand,
the regrettable statutory hiatus regarding the status of the non-filing
wife may represent a negative accomplishment; at least, this will be
the result in the absence of astute judicial construction or corrective
legislation."'
As stated earlier, the writer believes that the first category lays the
predicate for future substantive changes. Allowing the wife on her
own initiative to acquire full powers to convey and engage in litiga-
tion (as distinguished from the procedure in article 4626 requiring
the husband's joinder and a determination by a district court that
it is to her advantage) is an implied admission that the wife is com-
petent to handle the most serious of her affairs. This admission,
together with the previous judical and legislative determination that
the wife is competent to transfer personalty and make contracts
when such action is essential to the management of her separate prop-
erty or to the well being of herself and her children, logically leads
to the conclusion that the wife should be permitted to make bind-
ing contracts of other types also, viz., those necessary to the control
of her earnings and revenues. This conclusion seems valid unless
there is present in the latter type contracts and absent from the
former some element requiring that the protective shield of disability
be retained. No such element is apparent to the writer, who there-
fore believes that the 1957 legislation is the forerunner of more liber-
...See text accompanying note 132 supra.
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al statutes charting a return to the twin partnership plan of 1913. °°
If such enactments are forthcoming it is to be hoped that all
existing relics of the nineteenth century will be discarded in favor of
a comprehensive and detailed revision including specific provisions
for control by the wife of her personal earnings, of the revenues
from her separate property, of property purchased with special com-
munity funds and of the income from such property. Such a re-
vision, however, should place a commensurate responsibility on the
wife for the care of the family, including liability for the husband's
necessaries. If the wife is not to receive such control, then legislation
is needed to clarify the husband's control over the wife's earnings
and items purchased with her earnings and revenues, for in the usual
family situation, while it may be desirable that one spouse rather
than the other have control of these items, it is imperative that this
control be definitely vested in one or the other and that its scope be
clearly defined.
Durwood Douglas Crawford
... Huie, supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX
Legal Rights of Married Women in Texas
I. APPLICABLE STATUTES BEFORE THE 1957 AMENDMENTS
Art. 4614 Wife's Separate Property
All property of the wife, both real and personal, owned or claimed
by her before marriage, and that acquired afterward by gift, de-
vise, or descent, as [sic] also the increase of all lands thus acquired,
shall be the separate property of the wife. The wife shall have the
sole management, control, and disposition of her separate property,
both real and personal; provided however, the joinder of the hus-
band in the manner now provided by law for conveyances of the
separate real estate of the wife shall be necessary to the incumbrance
or conveyance by the wife of her lands, and the joint signature of
the husband and wife shall be necessary to a transfer of stocks and
bonds belonging to her or of which she may be given control by this
law.
Art. 4616. Wife's Separate Property Protected
Neither the separate property of the wife, nor the rents from the
wife's separate real estate, nor the interest on bonds and notes be-
longing to her, nor dividends on stocks owned by her, nor her per-
sonal earnings, shall be subject to the payment of debts contracted
by the husband nor of torts of the husband.
Art. 4623. Subject to Debts of Wife
Neither the separate property of the husband nor the community
property other than the personal earnings of the wife, and the in-
come, rents and revenues from her separate property, shall be sub-
ject to the payment of debts contracted by the wife, except those
contracted for necessaries furnished her or her children. The wife
shall never be the joint maker of a note or a surety on any bond or
obligation of another without the joinder of her husband with her
in making such contract.
Art. 4626. Application to be Feme Sole
Any married woman, with the consent of and joined by her hus-
band, may apply by written petition addressed to the district court
of the county in which she may desire to transact business for judg-
ment or orders of the said court removing her disabilities of cover-
ture and declaring her feme sole for mercantile and trading purposes;
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such petition shall set out the causes which make it to the advantage
of said married woman to be so declared feme sole, and shall be filed
and docketed as in other cases, and at any time thereafter the district
court may, in term time, take up and hear said petition and evidence
in regard thereto. If upon a hearing of said petition and evidence
relating thereto, it appears to the court that it would be to the ad-
vantage of the woman applying, then said court shall enter its de-
cree declaring said married woman feme sole for mercantile or trad-
ing purposes, and thereafter she may, in her own name, contract
and be contracted with, sue and be sued, and all of her separate
property not exempt from execution under the laws of Texas shall
thereafter be subject to her debts and liable under execution there-
for, and her contracts and obligations shall be binding on her.
II. APPLICABLE STATUTES AFTER THE 1957 AMENDMENTS
The following amendments became effective January 1, 1958. The
act included a saving clause making it inapplicable to transactions
completed prior to January 1, 1958 and to suits filed before that
date. Article 4626 was not changed by the 1957 amendments.
Art. 4614. Wife's Separate Property
(a) All property of the wife, both real and personal, owned or
claimed by her before marriage, and that acquired afterward, by
gift, devise, or descent, as also the increase of all lands thus acquired,
is the separate property of the wife.
(b) The wife shall, if she be 21 years of age or over and so elects
as provided in subsection (d), have the sole management, control,
and disposition of her separate property, both real and personal; and
in connection therewith, she may, in her own name, contract and
be contracted with, sue and be sued, without the joinder of her hus-
band, and her coverture shall not be a defense in any suit or action
based on such contracts. Such of her separate property as is not ex-
empt under the laws of Texas in such case shall be subject to forced
sale for the payment of her debts. The community property of the
husband and wife, with the exception of the wife's personal earnings
and the revenue from her separate property, shall never be subject
to the payment of debts contracted by the wife except for those
contracted for necessaries furnished herself and children.
(c) If the wife shall not elect to have sole management, control,
and disposition of her separate property, the joinder of the husband
shall be necessary to the encumbrance or conveyance by the wife of
1959]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
her lands, and the joint signature of the husband and wife shall be
necessary to a transfer of stocks and bonds belonging to her or of
which she may be given control by this law.
(d) A married woman 21 years of age, or over, may file with the
County Clerk of the county of which she is a resident, a duly ac-
knowledged statement that she thereby elects to have sole manage-
ment, control and disposition of her separate property. From and
after the date of filing of such statement, which shall be recorded by
the County Clerk in the Deed Records of said county, such married
woman shall have the full authority to deal with her separate proper-
ty as set forth in subsection (b) and the limitation upon such au-
thority contained in subsection (c) shall not thereafter apply.
Art. 4616. Wife's Separate Property Protected
Neither the separate property of the wife, her personal earnings,
nor the revenue from her separate property shall be subject to the
payment of debts contracted by the husband nor claims arising out
of the torts of the husband.
Art. 4623. Subject to Debts of Wife
Neither the separate property of the husband nor the community
property other than the personal earnings of the wife and the re-
venues from her separate property shall be subject to the payment
of debts contracted by the wife except those contracted for neces-
saries furnished her or her children.
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